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Abstract
This article introduces one way in which the private sector makes law— bottom-up 
transnational lawmaking. While this article explores one example in depth— the Berne 
Union’s regulation of export credit insurance— it concludes that bottom-up lawmaking 
peppers our legal landscape in a profound and largely unacknowledged way. More spe-
cifically, this article discusses how the private sector engages in international lawmaking 
and contemplates the normative implications of privatized transnational lawmaking.
Introduction
Two interrelated questions framed the deliberations from the Indiana Journal 
of Global Legal Studies symposium on “Democracy and the Transnational Private 
Sector:”1 1) to what extent is the transnational private sector assuming a lawmak-
ing role that previously belonged to the state, or some other official lawmaking 
entity? and 2) assuming that the empirical evidence bears fruit, what normative 
challenges does this ascendance of the transnational private sector pose in terms 
of democracy and democratic legitimacy? In this brief article, I offer my work on 
bottom-up transnational lawmaking as a window into both of these questions.
Part I of this article addresses the underlying empirical questions: 1) how, in 
practice, does the private sector engage in international lawmaking? and 2) how 
 * Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law; Yale Law School (J.D., 1994); Yale Uni-
versity (M.A., 1994); Princeton University (A.B., 1990). This article is based partly on a presentation 
I gave at the Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies symposium, “Democracy and the Transnational 
Private Sector,” and partly on an earlier article I wrote, Bottom-Up Transnational Lawmaking: Reflec-
tions on the New Haven School of International Law, 32 Yale J. Int’l L. 393 (2007).
 1. Held April 12–13, 2007 at Indiana University School of Law—Bloomington.
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widespread is the phenomenon? Part I recounts an instance of bottom-up trans-
national lawmaking as illustrative of how the private sector engages in lawmak-
ing. In short, bottom-up lawmaking is a soft, unchoreographed process, often 
under private-sector tutelage, that produces hard legal results. While the story at 
the heart of Part I unfolds in the relatively niche world of international trade fi-
nance, Part I concludes with numerous and diverse bottom-up lawmaking ex-
amples, thereby suggesting that private-sector-led, bottom-up lawmaking occurs 
much more than we suspect. 
Using bottom-up lawmaking as the lens, Part II of this article contemplates the 
normative implications of privatized transnational lawmaking. In reality, these pri-
vate, bottom-up lawmaking communities tend to be very club-like, with secrecy 
and exclusivity assuming normative status within the group. In light of this secretive 
penchant, Part II asks whether private transnational lawmaking is a legitimate route 
to law. In contemplating answers, this article measures legitimacy not only against 
democratic norms (accountability, transparency, etc.), but also against efficacy of 
legal outcomes and policies. Yet, neither “opening” the lawmaking process (and 
thus more closely approximating democratic lawmaking) nor calibrating the effi-
cacy of ensuing regulation satisfactorily answers the legitimacy critique. Instead, 
this article suggests that legitimacy may unduly preoccupy our attention, for the 
bottom-up lawmaking process itself may correct many of the deficits.   
I. Bottom-Up Lawmaking Happens
A. Export Credit Insurance: A Bottom-Up Lawmaking Tale 
My work on bottom-up lawmaking, which to date has focused on the realm 
of international trade and finance,2 suggests that private parties and other “infor-
mal” or “unofficial” lawmaking communities3 indeed play a significant role in 
 2. See, e.g., Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to International Lawmaking: The Tale of 
Three Trade Finance Instruments, 30 Yale J. Int’l L. 125, 172–73 (2005) (noting that norms cross 
the soft-law/hard-law divide but without explaining in any robust way the push or the pull).
 3. As a point of definitional clarity, this article uses the terms “informal” or “unofficial” law-
making community to refer to a transnational group, often institutionalized, which is neither 
constituted by treaty, nor any other legally binding instrument, thereby lacking direct authority to 
make legally binding law. This article employs the term “treaty,” as in The Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 333 art. 2 (“‘Treaty’ means an international 
agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law.”). As 
such, this article employs, but does not endorse, the formality of the legally “binding” versus “non-
binding” dichotomy. “Binding international law” includes: 1) a treaty or other international agree-
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constituting international (or transnational) law. Consider the World Trade Or-
ganization Agreement on Subsidies (Agreement on Subsidies).4 On its surface, 
the agreement is a “top-down,” government-driven effort to solve the endemic 
cooperation, coordination, and free-riding problems of creating an “even playing 
field” for exporters. The Agreement on Subsidies promises to curb (in trade lan-
guage, discipline) the use of trade-distorting subsidies in the name of free trade. 
Where did these rules come from? Were they the result of choreographed state 
bargaining and diplomatic wrangling? Perhaps some of the rules in the Agree-
ment on Subsidies were, indeed, a product of such top-down negotiations. 
Yet, an alternative account of the Agreement on Subsidies tells us about the 
work of private parties and low-level bureaucrats, and starts long before the 
founding of the World Trade Organization (WTO); it focuses on the rather ar-
cane, technical world of officially supported export credit, specifically the world of 
export credit insurance. Export credit insurance functions like automobile insur-
ance, except that the asset the insurance company protects is not a car but rather a 
trade receivable. With the backing of an insurance provider, an exporter may ex-
tend credit to an importer without significantly adding to its risk portfolio. Where 
liquidity is an issue, a receivable backed by an export credit insurance policy en-
hances the exporter’s ability to monetize the receivable, either by selling it or bor-
rowing against it. Export credit insurance, therefore, is one solution to a recurring 
exporter problem—how to extend credit to a buyer, who might be thousands of 
miles away, without choking the seller’s working capital and concomitant ability 
to continue producing and engaging in trade transactions.
So, if these insurance policies are a type of exporter’s nirvana, where can you 
purchase one? Can you go to the State Farm office down the street? Indeed, private 
insurance companies, such as Chubb, American Insurance Group (AIG), and FCIA 
issue export credit insurance. Also, government entities—entities known as export 
credit agencies (ECAs)—participate in the export credit insurance market by issu-
ing export credit insurance to their nationals in the name of supporting and pro-
moting local exports.5 ECA—government—participation in the export credit 
ment, as defined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 2) customary international law; 
and 3) (and a true third) general principles of law. Restatement Third of Foreign Relations 
Law § 102 (1986); Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, 
33 U.N.T.S. 993. 
 4. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 155 
[hereinafter Agreement on Subsidies].
 5. The Export-Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im Bank) is the U.S. ECA. I was Assis-
tant General Counsel of Ex-Im Bank from 1998–2000, and I not only observed but also partici-
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insurance industry marks it as a potential breeding ground for subsidies and thus a 
target for some type of transnational coordination and regulation. 
Indeed, that is precisely what happened, although a grand ministerial act or 
the founding of some large WTO-style institution was not the triggering event.6 
Instead, an export credit insurance regulatory regime was born in 1934 over 
drinks in a bar in Berne, Switzerland, when a small group of private European 
export credit insurers decided to pool experiential data regarding claims and re-
covery experiences in the name of sound insurance practice. This informal gath-
ering gave birth to the Berne Union. Currently, the Berne Union has more than 
fifty members, public and private, almost all from the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) or industrialized countries.7 
On the surface, the Berne Union initially appears as a mere trade association, 
in which case its founding would be unexceptional and certainly unworthy of 
much scholarly scrutiny. However, following World War II, when government 
ECAs began using export credit insurance as an aggressive backdoor to subsidize 
exports,8 Berne Union members—private insurers and government technocrats—
decided to transform the Berne Union from a mere gatherer and disseminator of 
insurance-related information into a regulator to target abusive and aggressive 
subsidy practices. 
Over the years, the members have used the semiannual Berne Union get-to-
gethers as a focal point to collect and share their practices and approaches to a 
variety of regulatory questions, and they have codified these in a living document 
called the “General Understanding.”9 The General Understanding essentially di-
vides the universe of insurable goods and services into seven groups. Within each 
category, the General Understanding prescribes specific, technical, and at times, 
cumbersome rules to standardize the type of insurance products that members 
may offer and circumscribes the terms that such policies may contain. Thus, the 
General Understanding is a comprehensive regulatory matrix for the export credit 
pated in the very lawmaking process that I now recount. 
 6. For a more extensive treatment of this lawmaking story, see Levit, supra note 2, at 144–57.
 7. International Union of Credit & Investment Insurers, Berne Union Members, http://www 
.berneunion.org.uk/bu_profiles.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2008).
 8. Peter C. Evans, The Politics of State-Backed Trade Finance: Competition, Collusion and Redis-
tribution in Official Export Credits, 44–48 (June 22, 2004) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology) (on file with author). See also Hugh Dowell, A Brief Historical 
Note— 62 Years Ago (facsimile sent to author from Berne Union, June 22, 2004) (on file with author).
 9. International Union of Credit and Investment Insurers, The Berne Union Agree-
ments, Understandings and Obligations in the Export Credit Insurance Field: General 
Understanding (2001), available at http://www.nexi.go.jp/insurance/ins_berun/pdf/berun1.pdf.
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insurance industry, essentially translating insurers’ on-the-ground experiences 
into a set of technical rules designed to calibrate transactions and discipline ensu-
ing practice, thereby preventing an export credit insurance policy from masking a 
predatory export subsidy. 
Furthermore, Berne Union rules have been quite successful in facilitating 
over a half-trillion dollars in trade annually while dramatically reducing export 
credit subsidies.10 Accordingly, when the Agreement on Subsidies attempted to 
draw a line between prohibited export subsidies and other types of permitted gov-
ernment support, it punted on the issue of “officially supported export credit” and 
instead created a safe harbor around the Berne Union’s rules (via another infor-
mal “gentleman’s agreement” that essentially borrows from the Berne Union’s 
General Understanding).11 Thus, the Agreement on Subsidies deems officially 
supported export credit insurance policy to be a prohibited export subsidy unless 
it complies with some Berne Union rules. 
This Berne Union example offers a glimpse of bottom-up transnational law-
making at work. It is relatively modest, quiet, and subterranean, grounded in the 
practitioners (in this case, export credit insurers) who join with others similarly 
situated in avocation (although often quite distant in location) to share experi-
ences, standardize practice, and codify norms. While these norms are often in-
tended as a form of self-regulation, over time, they embed in a more formal legal 
system and harden into “law.” Thus, whereas top-down lawmaking is a process of 
law internalized as practice, bottom-up international lawmaking is a soft, uncho-
reographed process whereby private practices are externalized as law.
B. Bottom-Up Lawmaking Beyond the Berne Union
While the technicality and obscurity of this Berne Union example may ini-
tially strike as a niche outlier, my research shows—and in fact the very advent of 
 10. Tadao Chino, The Changing Picture, 2005 Berne Union Y.B. 118.
 11. The General Understanding rules have been incorporated into the Arrangement on Offi-
cially Supported Export Credit [the Arrangement], which is self-referentially a “Gentleman’s 
Agreement,” drafted and managed by the Participants Group, an informal “club” of ECA export 
credit insurers that is loosely affiliated with the Export Credit Group of the OECD. See Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Arrangement on Officially Supported 
Export Credits, Doc. TD/PG (2004) 12/REV (Jan. 27, 2005). The Agreement on Subsidies creates 
a safe harbor for ECAs that comply with the Arrangement. See Agreement on Subsidies, supra 
note 4, at annex I(k). For a more detailed discussion of the relationship between the Berne Union 
rules, the Arrangement, and the Agreement on Subsidies, see Levit, supra note 2, at 156–67.
54 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 15:1
this symposium corroborates—that much that we deem to be international law, 
in fact much that we deem to be domestic law, is simply the tip of the iceberg, 
masking a profound, bottom-up lawmaking undercurrent that potently shapes 
our legal landscape. I have told the bottom-up lawmaking story in a variety of 
contexts—from trade finance to climate change,12 using a variety of lawmaking 
communities, some populated with private actors and some with low-level bu-
reaucrats, some “tightly-knit” and others more diffuse. Perhaps, with this grow-
ing body of data, it would be useful and productive to begin thinking about a 
bottom-up lawmaking typology, roughly dividing instances into three groups: 
regulation, harmonization (standardization), and epistemic communities. 
In addition to this Berne Union example, I have explored other instances of 
regulatory bottom-up lawmaking, particularly official export guarantees13 and 
the International Chamber of Commerce’s role in regulating letters of credit.14 
Regulatory bottom-up lawmaking occurs when tightly-knit, homogenous com-
munities codify industry norms in an effort to constrain rent-seeking behavior 
within a group and simultaneously lock in rents for the group.15 Typically this 
process occurs in an institutionalized setting, with many of the trappings of legis-
lative-like decision making.16 Yet, these private communities often become law-
makers, sometimes purposefully and sometimes inadvertently, as officialdom 
defers to the insular community’s regulatory choices. 
Closely related, harmonization or standardization efforts also may morph 
into a bottom-up lawmaking exercise. Industry participants and related interest 
groups often coalesce within a standard-setting body or a trade association to cre-
ate a floor, or “voluntary” minimum standards,17 to which all within the industry 
should conform. Yet, these “voluntary” standards often become safe harbors in 
 12. Janet Koven Levit, Bottom-Up Transnational Lawmaking: Reflections on the New Haven 
School of International Law, 32 Yale J. Int’l L. 393 (2007).
 13. See generally Janet Koven Levit, The Dynamics of International Trade Finance Regulation: The 
Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits, 45 Harv. Int’l L. J. 65 (2004).
 14. Janet Koven Levit, Bottom-Up Lawmaking Through a Pluralist Lens: The ICC Banking Com-
mission and the Transnational Regulation of Letters of Credit, 58 Emory L.J. (forthcoming 2008). 
 15. See generally Robert B. Ahdieh, The Role of Groups in Norm Transformation: A Dramatic 
Sketch, in Three Parts, 6 Chi. J. Int’l L. 231 (2005). 
 16. See, e.g., Paul B. Stephan, Accountability and International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents and Le-
gitimacy, 17 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 681, 700–02 (1996). 
 17. These standards are “voluntary” in the formal legal sense, meaning that legal sanctions will 
not attach to defection. However, if an industry actor decides not to comply with the standard, 
then it bears a significant risk of market ostracism.
 Bottom-Up Lawmaking 55
formal international agreements (i.e., compliance with the standard assures com-
pliance with the agreement) and thus approximate binding, formal law.18 
Epistemic bottom-up lawmaking occurs in a more atomistic, less coordinated, 
fashion, when, in the absence of top-down regulation, various issue-based con-
stituencies nonetheless abide by relatively similar norms that, in and of themselves, 
define an epistemic community and exert pressure on formal law. Thus, I have 
argued that normative pressure for climate change regulation, as well as govern-
ment mandates of corporate social responsibility regulation, flows from such 
epistemic communities.19 
Yet, at its core, these diverse bottom-up lawmaking stories share two defining 
characteristics. First, the “bottom-up” label grounds the normative process in 
both public and private practitioners, including those motivated by altruism and 
those motivated by profit, who join with others similarly situated in avocation to 
share experiences and standardize practices toward shared goals. “Practitioner,” 
as used in the bottom-up lawmaking context, is a deliberately broad term, used 
loosely to describe those on-the-ground, armed with intimate knowledge of their 
niche trade and/or interest areas, who embody norms rooted in nitty-gritty tech-
nicalities rather than the winds of geopolitics and diplomacy. 
 18. See, for example, the relationship between the International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO) and various World Trade Organization agreements. For instance, the WTO Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) assures that technical standards are not a mask for 
predatory restraints on trade. Annex 3 of the TBT Agreement offers a Code of Good Practice for the 
Preparation, Adoption and Application of Standards (the TBT Code of Good Practice). The TBT 
Agreement requires all member states to adopt the TBT Code of Good Practice vis-à-vis central 
government activities and strongly encourages adoption at the sub-state, regional, and local level. 
Importantly, the TBT Code of Good Practice states that “[w]here international standards exist or 
their completion is imminent, the standardizing body shall use them, or the relevant parts of them, 
as a basis for the standards it develops.” TBT Agreement, Annex 3, art. F. Thus, international stan-
dards, with explicit reference to the International Organization for Standardization and the Interna-
tional Electrotechnical Commission, become a type of baseline mandate for WTO members. 
Likewise, the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, defers 
to several quasi-public standard setting bodies, Codex Alimenterius, International Office of Epizoot-
ics, and the relevant international and regional organizations operating within the framework of the 
International Plant Protection Convention. See generally ISO/IEC Information Centre, WTO, ISO, 
IEC and World Trade, http://www.standardsinfo.net/info/livelink/fetch/2000/148478/6301438/int-
trade.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2008).
 19. Janet K. Levit, International Law Happens (Whether the Executive Likes It Or Not), in SELA 
2006: El Poder Ejecutivo (Roberto Saba ed., forthcoming 2007) (published in Spanish) (explor-
ing bottom-up lawmaking as an alternative to state-made law in climate change regulation, as well 
as human rights, i.e., corporate social responsibility), available at http://law.bepress.com/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=7853&content=expresso. See also Levit, supra note 12.
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Second, bottom-up transnational lawmaking joins two interrelated sub- 
processes: 1) an informal process of norm creation and 2) a hardening process, 
whereby official legal systems embed such informal norms, either at the prompt-
ing of the informal group or because the norms offer attractive legal solutions to 
collective action problems. While the first necessarily precedes the second, the two 
processes become inextricably linked in a loop of interpretation, assessment, and 
alignment. 
Bottom-up lawmaking is thus the antithesis of top-down lawmaking. It is not 
the world of jet-setting diplomats or Rose Garden signing ceremonies. Nor is it the 
world of Eric Posner and Jack Goldsmith,20 who conceive of international law in 
instrumental terms, as one of many tools that the President may deliberately deploy 
in furtherance of the “national interest.” In the traditional top-down approach, state 
elites enact rules (typically formal, treaty-based rules) that govern the practices and 
behavior of those subject to the rules; in this account, lawmaking often ensues well 
beyond the physical and metaphysical reach of law’s subjects. In contrast, a bottom-
up approach to law focuses on the ways that practices and behaviors of various actors 
inform and constitute rules, which, in turn, govern such practices and behaviors. 
The drama in these bottom-up cases is how the informal, practice-based rules es-
cape relatively confined groups and “bubble-up” to become “law.” 
While bottom-up lawmaking is not top-down lawmaking, it is likewise not 
mere self-regulation. Onlookers may initially dismiss stories like the one devel-
oped in this article as unexceptional examples of private, self-regulatory behavior. 
From the range of Shasta County, California21 to the diamond bourses of New 
York22 to the tuna courts in Tokyo,23 many legal scholars and economists discover 
discrete “private legal systems.” These scholars argue that private, “closely knit” 
homogeneous micro-societies often create their own norms that, at times, trump 
 20. See generally Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law 
(2005); Levit, supra note 12.
 21. This is a reference to the study of social norms among ranchers and farmers in Shasta 
County, California that formed the core of Robert Ellickson’s classic work, Order without Law 
177–78 (1991).
 22. See Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System, 21 J. Leg. St. 115 (1992) (discussing the 
system of “private lawmaking” in the New York Diamond Dealers Club); Lisa Bernstein, Merchant 
Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking The Code’s Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 1765 (1996) (National Grain and Feed Association); Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law 
in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 
1724 (2001) (observing private legal system in the markets for the purchase and sale of cotton).
 23. See generally Eric A. Feldman, The Tuna Court: Law and Norms in the World’s Premier Fish 
Market, 94 Cal. L. Rev. 313 (2006).
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state law and, at other times, fill lacunae in state regulation, but nonetheless oper-
ate autonomously and beyond the reach of officialdom.24 In this scholarly para-
digm, a private legal system stands as an alternative to, often in opposition to, the 
state’s official legal apparatus. 
Yet, unlike private legal systems, which are largely self-contained and con-
fined, bottom-up lawmaking is a process that traverses legal communities by, in 
this case, charting a route that links unofficial “law” to officialdom. Thus, while 
private lawmaking or private legal system scholarship may offer insight into the 
ways in which group members constitute, interpret, and enforce norms among 
group members, it does not contemplate, explain, or conceptualize the normative 
ties between lawmaking communities. Since many private legal system scholars 
are critical of state incursions in private life because they see themselves as offer-
ing a viable (and perhaps preferable) alternative to state law, their analyses often 
fail to contemplate the extent to which the state, or official lawmaking institu-
tions, borrow from such private law or the extent to which the private lawmaking 
group lobbies the state to adopt its norms.25 Indeed, this article’s lawmaking ex-
ample suggests that, on a transnational plane, a relatively private form of lawmak-
ing may be an interim step on a bottom-up lawmaking process. 
II. A Normative Challenge Posed by Bottom-Up Lawmaking
A. Closed, Club-Like Lawmaking
From an empirical perspective, bottom-up lawmaking is a rather diverse, yet 
ubiquitous, phenomenon that will remain a steadfast, irrepressible feature of the 
lawmaking landscape. In other words, bottom-up lawmaking happens whether 
we like it or not. However, once we understand that the transnational private sec-
tor often plays a significant, if not definitive, role in the lawmaking process, we 
must at least contemplate this conference’s second normative question—whether 
bottom-up lawmaking is a legitimate route to law. 
 24. See Ellickson, supra note 21 at 177–78. For example, despite formal California legal rules to 
the contrary, informal norms in Shasta County make an animal owner (usually a rancher) liable 
for the trespass (and ensuing damage) of his animals, except that Shasta County residents essen-
tially absorb de minimis damage, maintaining instead a mental accounting of the damage, on the 
belief that “what goes around comes around.” Id. at 53–54. 
 25. But see David V. Snyder, Private Lawmaking, 64 Ohio St. L.J. 371, 403–12 (2003) (arguing 
that the rules that come from private lawmaking groups, like the ICC Banking Commission, are 
technically law). 
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The reality is that these private, bottom-up lawmaking communities tend to 
be very secretive, exclusive, and club-like. On account of such secrecy, many who 
read my work condemn bottom-up lawmaking as an illegitimate route to law. It 
was quite a rude awakening to have my mentor of fifteen years label bottom-up 
lawmaking a “dangerous threat to democratic principles.”26 So, if you would in-
dulge me, I would like to offer a Berne Union anecdote as a window into some of 
these concerns.
The Berne Union does not publish the General Understanding anywhere, 
and my quest to find the General Understanding was a modern treasure hunt 
meeting countless dead-ends and spanning four aggravating months.27 Then, un-
expectedly, one Berne Union member sent me the General Understanding with-
out any confidentiality stipulations.28 Coincidentally, the Secretary General of the 
Berne Union also granted me a phone interview in which she requested a draft of 
the article prior to publication, which I provided as a courtesy. After seeing a draft 
of the article, where I discussed Berne Union rules and criticized its penchant for 
secretive lawmaking, the Secretary General dangled what I perceived as a veiled 
threat of legal action against the Yale Journal of International Law and me. 
I recall this story to highlight that some of these bottom-up lawmaking com-
munities are black boxes, and club-like secrecy often assumes normative status. 
My personal frustration was great, but my frustration was merely linked to the 
fact that I knew I had a story to tell and that I felt excommunicated from a trade 
finance community in which I had enjoyed membership. The rules themselves, 
however, had no direct impact on me (or, at least, only the most attenuated effect 
as a consumer of goods). 
Yet, consider the exasperation of government officials in Brazil when in the 
heat of a dispute with Canada (Canadair), the WTO proclaims that Brazil’s (Em-
braer’s) export credit programs essentially must abide by Berne Union rules or 
run afoul of the Agreement on Subsidies, with the concomitant risk of counter-
 26. Indeed, in response to my presentation at the 2006 Seminario en Latinoamérica de Teoría 
Constitucional y Política (SELA), the presentation that provided the outline for this article, Pro-
fessor Owen Fiss responds that “democracy must be the bedrock” of law’s legitimacy, and that my 
search for an alternative grounding is a “dangerous” project. See Owen Fiss, Concluding Remarks, 
Moderator for “Globalization and Executive Power” at Yale Law School’s Southern Cone Faculty 
Research Seminar: Seminario en Latinoamérica de Teoría Constitucional y Política (SELA), Ex-
ecutive Power, Bogota, Colombia (June 9, 2006), reprinted in SELA 2006, supra note 19.
 27. For a more extensive treatment of my personal interaction with the Berne Union, see Janet 
Koven Levit, A Cosmopolitan View of Bottom-Up Transnational Lawmaking: The Case of Export 
Credit Insurance, 51 Wayne L. Rev. 1193, 1204–07 (2005).
 28. See Levit, supra note 2, at n.107. See also Levit,  supra note 27, at n.51.
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vailing measures.29 So what has happened here? An informal, yet exclusive, club-
like group of private actors and technocrats from industrialized countries have 
pooled their practices and experiences and transformed them into rules that es-
sentially prop the cost of export credit insurance (in the name of preventing hid-
den export subsidies). While the Berne Union initially intended that these rules 
would apply to members, more formal lawmaking institutions, in this case the 
OECD and then the WTO, eventually (and perhaps inadvertently) appropriated 
the rules. Ultimately, these rules have become the law that the WTO uses to de-
cide a dispute against Brazil, but neither Brazil nor any representative from any 
developing country participated in the formation of these rules, either through 
direct deliberations or indirect delegations of authority. Thus, in making law be-
hind impervious, fortress-like walls, the Berne Union ultimately creates a disjunc-
ture between law’s subjects and lawmakers. 
This mismatch—this disjuncture—between law and lawmaker leads Brazil 
to question the legitimacy of Berne Union rules and the WTO’s decision based on 
these rules. In particular, Brazil resents rules that constrain its ability to promote 
domestic industry, in this case the aircraft industry, when it “did not bargain for” 
and had “no voice” in negotiating such rules. 30 
Is Brazil correct? Are Berne Union rules born from a bottom-up lawmaking 
process to be condemned as illegitimate? Otherwise stated, can law be legitimate 
if it binds a transnational actor that was alienated from the lawmaking process? Is 
participation in lawmaking a necessary predicate for law’s legitimacy?
Before answering these questions, a bit of definitional clarity is in order. “Le-
gitimacy” is a normative justification for the exercise of authority, highly depen-
dent on context.31 For instance, Ruth Grant and Robert Keohane have recently 
argued that the legitimacy of the exercise of authority on the transnational plane 
depends on a case-specific cocktail of informal norms (human rights, democratic 
 29. The reference here is to a recent dispute between Canada and Brazil over Brazil’s export 
credit program in support of Embraer aircraft. WTO Dispute Panel Report on Canada Compliant 
Concerning Brazil’s Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (April 14, 1999) WT/DS46/R, ¶ 
7.31. The decision essentially required that Brazil comply with the Arrangement on Officially 
Supported Export Credit rules, rules which are based in large part on the General Understanding. 
See supra note 11, for more detailed discussion of the attenuated relationship between the General 
Understanding and the Agreement on Subsidies. 
 30. Brazil and other developing countries expressed much concern over being bound by rules 
made, in large part, by the exclusive club of developed, OECD countries. See Levit, supra note 2, at 
204–05 n.328.
 31. See Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for 
International Environmental Law, 93 Am. J. Int’l L. 556, 601 (1999).
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principles, and mechanisms to redress “patterns of extreme economic inequality”) 
and formalized law.32 Daniel Bodansky roots legitimacy in the source of pur-
ported authority; open, participatory processes; and/or regulatory acumen.33 Fun-
damentally, for Keohane, Grant, and Bodansky, law finds legitimacy either in the 
nature of the lawmaking process or in the substance of the legal outcome.34 Often 
this distinction is referred to as “input” legitimacy (i.e., following democratic pro-
cesses and/or legalized procedures; opening lawmaking processes to broad-based 
participation) and “output” legitimacy (i.e., outcomes that draw upon niche ex-
pertise or that satisfy certain substantive regulatory goals), and this article will 
explore each in turn.  
B. Input Legitimacy: Lawmaking Through Democratic Processes
If we return to this article’s example, the gravaman of Brazil’s complaint is 
that, as an issuer of export credit insurance policies,35 it had a right to participate 
in the promulgation of rules that limited its autonomy to use export credit insur-
ance aggressively in support of nationals’ exports. Thus, Brazil laments legal re-
strictions on export credit insurance that are not “of” export credit insurers, “by” 
export credit insurers, and “for” export credit insurers.36 In questioning the legiti-
macy of law on account of its exclusion from the lawmaking process, Brazil links 
legitimacy to participation in governance and argues that bottom-up lawmaking 
presents a classic democratic deficit.37 
 32. Ruth W. Grant & Robert O. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics, 
99 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 29, 35 (2005).
 33. Bodansky, supra note 31, at 611–23 (discussing democracy, public participation, and expertise 
and distinct bases of legitimacy).
 34. As legitimacy is a deeply contested concept, these two definitions are not without competi-
tors and detractors.  Yet, as this necessarily brief article purports neither to review “legitimacy” 
comprehensively nor propose a solution to a well-worn debate, these two conceptions, which float 
prominently in the transnational lawmaking literature, will serve as a basis for our analysis of the 
legitimacy of bottom-up lawmaking.
 35. Brazil issues export credit insurance through its export credit agency (ECA), the Brazilian 
Development Bank, BNDES. See BNDES, Export Support, http://www.bndes.gov.br/english/ 
export_lines.asp (last visited Feb. 28, 2008).
 36. This is a reference to Abraham Lincoln’s description of democracy as a form of government 
that is “of the people, by the people, and for the people.” Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address 
(Nov. 19, 1963), http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/25.htm. 
 37. The “democratic deficit” generally refers to institutional and/or structural features of a law-
making community that result in the lawmaking process falling short of the democratic ideal, 
most frequently understood in the participatory sense.  See, e.g., Francesca E. Bignami, The Demo-
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Yet, mismatch between the “governed” and the “governors” does not per se 
condemn Berne Union rules, as applied to Brazilian export credit agencies, as un-
democratic. Democratic theory has for centuries, since the demise of the Roman 
city-state assemblies, grappled with ways to assure that governance that was not lit-
erally “by the people” remains “of the people.”38 While the theoretical underpin-
nings of democracy undoubtedly remain a point of heated academic and 
philosophical debate,39 and while these different theoretical perspectives reconcile 
the mismatch between governed and governors in distinct ways, a common bedrock 
is lawmaker accountability.40 “Accountability,” like “legitimacy,” is a term with con-
tested meaning, although all versions entail the “governed” exercising some type of 
control, albeit often quite attenuated and weak, over the “governors.”41
Prominent theories of representative and republican democracy anoint ma-
cratic Deficit in European Community Rulemaking: A Call for Notice and Comment in Comitology, 
40 Harv. Int’l L.J. 451 (1999). See generally Alfred C. Aman, The Democracy Deficit: Taming 
Globalization Through Law Reform (2004).
 38. See Robert A. Dahl, On Democracy 7–25 (1998) (noting that “pure” democracy or direct 
democracy is of the type developed in Athens or ancient Rome); Robert A. Dahl, Dilemmas of 
Pluralist Democracy (1982).
 39. For some, democracy is participation; for others, democracy is deliberation; yet for others, de-
mocracy has independent, normative weight. For a sampling of democratic theory, see generally 
Norberto Bobbio, Democracy and Dictatorship (1981); Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic 
Theory (1956); Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (1961); Carlos Santiago Nino, 
Constitution of Deliberative Democracy (1996); Robert Post, Constitutional Domains: De-
mocracy, Community, Management (1995). For an overview of these competing theories, espe-
cially as they relate to accountability in international politics, see Andrew Moravcsik, Is there a 
‘Democratic Deficit’ in World Politics?  A Framework for Analysis, 39 Gov’t & Opposit’n 336, 338–43 
(2004) (discussing libertarian, pluralist, social democratic and deliberative notions of democracy).
 40. See also David Held & Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, Introduction to Special Issue of Miliband 
Conference on Global Governance and Public Accountability, London School of Economics and Po-
litical Science, May 17–18, 2002, reprinted in 39 Gov’t & Opposit’n 125, 125 (2004) (“[T]here is 
agreement among democrats that wherever power is exercised there should be mechanisms of ac-
countability.”). In fact, Justice Anthony Kennedy recently noted that “accountability is the essence 
of democracy.” Associate Justice Anthony Kennedy, Plenary Address, American Society of Inter-
national Law Annual Meeting (March 30, 2006).
 41. Grant & Keohane, supra note 32, at 1 (Accountability “implies that some actors have the right 
to hold other actors to a set of standards, to judge whether they have fulfilled their responsibilities 
in light of these standards, and to impose sanctions if they determine that these responsibilities 
have not been met.”); Held & Koenig-Archibugi, supra note 40, at 127 (“Accountability refers to the 
fact that decision-makers do not enjoy unlimited autonomy but have to justify their actions vis-à-
vis affected parties, that is, stakeholders.”); Stephan, supra note 16, at 684 (“[T]he kinds of account-
ability that matter are those by which the governed exercise control over their governors.”).
62 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 15:1
jority voting as the arbiter of democratic accountability.42 The “demos”—the 
“governed”—embrace periodic elections to choose “governors,” delegate decision-
making authority to such governors, and offer implicit consent to governors’ deci-
sions during the elected term. If governors make law that the governed deem 
distasteful, unsatisfactory, and/or illegitimate, the governed may choose not to re-
elect the governors, and the specter of such sanction maintains some semblance of 
accountability throughout the term. 
Yet, one of the defining features of bottom-up lawmaking is that the law-
makers—in this case private insurance companies and low-level bureaucrats 
within ECAs—tend to be non-state actors and career civil servants rather than 
elected politicians. Thus, the actors who participate in bottom-up lawmaking do 
not stand for periodic re-election. Therefore, in the bottom-up lawmaking con-
text, voting and elections are untenable routes to accountability.
However, accountability need not occur through republican-style voting for 
representatives. Consider the vast realm of administrative rulemaking in the United 
States,43 which stands as a legitimate part of our legal system even though the au-
thors are often the bureaucrats and technocrats in the trenches who do not stand for 
re-election and who are not political appointees. Nonetheless, we create a variety of 
accountability mechanisms and feedback loops so that stakeholders retain some 
control over regulatory outcomes and, in turn, lawmakers remain accountable.44 For 
example, notice and comment rulemaking demands that agencies publish (and re-
publish) proposed rules, accept comments from interested parties (this often includes 
oral hearings), and justify the ultimate rules in the context of the comments;45 the 
 42. Dahl, On Democracy, supra note 38, at 37 (arguing that voting, in particular voting equality, 
is a cornerstone of all democracy); Thomas Jefferson, Letter to John Taylor (May 28, 1816), reprinted 
in Social and Political Philosophy 251–255 (John Somerville & Ronald E. Santoni eds., 1963). 
 43. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000) (codifying informal, notice-and-comment rulemaking). Note that the 
administration of George W. Bush has aggressively used notice-and-comment rulemaking, espe-
cially in the environmental areas. See, e.g., Bruce Barcott, Changing All the Rules, N.Y. Times Mag., 
April 4, 2004, at 38.
 44. I owe this insight in great part to the work of Laura A. Dickinson, Government for Hire: 
Privatizing Foreign Affairs and the Problem of Accountability Under International Law, 47 Wm. & 
Mary L. Rev. 135, 169–78 (although agency officials do not stand for election and re-election, ad-
ministrative law and governance offer alternative mechanisms to create “feedback loops” that in-
fuse varying degrees of accountability in the system of administrative law).
 45. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2000) (agencies must publish a notice of proposed rulemaking in the Fed-
eral Register, which includes: time, place and nature of rulemaking proceedings; legal authority 
for proposed rule; and “either terms or substance of proposed rule or a description of the subjects 
and issues involved); Id. at § 553(c) (“The agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to 
participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or 
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Freedom of Information Act grants all citizens access to government records re-
garding rules and rulemaking;46 and sunshine laws require that certain agency deci-
sions be made in open meetings at published times.47
If administrative law operates as it should, agencies and agency lawmakers are 
not black boxes or impervious fortresses. To the contrary, we accept agency-enacted 
rules as a legitimate feature of our democratic system because the “governed” have 
meaningful opportunities to participate in governance. Administrative law assures 
that stakeholders not only know when lawmakers contemplate relevant regulatory 
change, as well as the nature and scope of such proposed changes, but also enjoy a 
well-paved avenue for participating in the lawmaking process—expressing opin-
ions, offering expertise, and introducing alternative regulatory approaches. 
Our vast web of administrative law is thereby premised on “participatory” (or 
perhaps even “deliberative” democracy) rather than “republican” democracy.48 In 
this account, opportunities for participation—opening space for a cacophony of 
voices—offer the “governed” a means to place pressure on the course of law. 
While such “pressure” is no guarantee that the “governors” will cede to the desires 
of the “governed,”49 such attenuated control nonetheless maintains adequate ac-
countability to legitimate ensuing law.50 Thus, participatory models of democracy 
close the gap between the “governed” and the “governors” by granting the former 
a proverbial seat at the lawmaking table, an opportunity to voice opinions and 
exercise persuasion.
If participation is a linchpin to accountability, then transparency (or the free 
flow of information) is the bridge to robust, meaningful participation. Imagine a 
world in which a regulatory entity, like the Berne Union, permitted non- 
members, like Brazil, to “participate” in its rulemaking processes, such as attend 
without opportunity for oral presentation.”); Id.at § 706(2) (The agency must justify the ultimate 
rule with a “general statement of their basis and purpose” and a reviewing court may overturn the 
rule if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion.”). Some courts take an in-depth look (re-
ferred to as a “hard look”) at whether an administrative agency has justified its ultimate rule vis-
à-vis the comments that it receives. See generally Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
 46. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000 & Supp. 2002).
 47. The Government in the Sunshine Act, Id. at § 552b.
 48. See generally Robert Dahl, Who Governs?:Democracy and Power in an American City 
(2005); Dahl, On Democracy, supra note 38; Levit, supra note 12, at n. 84. 
 49. In fact, on account of the rather attenuated relationship between “public participation” and 
public decision-making, Daniel Bodansky is relatively hesitant to tie participatory accounts of le-
gitimacy to democratic accounts of legitimacy. Bodansky, supra note 31, at 614.
 50. See Grant & Keohane, supra note 32, at 3 (discussing participation as a route to accountability 
(and thereby legitimacy)).
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Berne Union meetings, but did not publish meeting agendas or substantive rules. 
Without information regarding the scope, nature, and content of the proposed 
regulation, Brazil would not know which meetings to attend. And, even if Brazil 
wanted to “hedge its bets” by attending all meetings, it would be under-prepared 
to respond to regulatory challenges. Participation without information becomes 
nominal participation, and, to the extent that participation is the bridge to ac-
countability, accountability thereby becomes nominal as well.
Thus, participation holds the promise of being real and robust only where 
there is transparency. Transparency is a window to unadulterated information. 
Information clearly delineates the “governed” by alerting stakeholders among the 
general public and forms the bedrock upon which stakeholders form opinions or 
regulatory alternatives. In addition, the integrity of stakeholders’ opinions or pro-
posals often calibrates “governors’” alacrity in response to participation in the law-
making process. Without transparency, honest, real participation is impossible; 
without participation, the “governed” must find alternative means to hold the 
“governors” accountable; and without accountability, law must find legitimacy 
outside of its constitutive processes. At a baseline, lawmaking processes must be 
transparent; there must be a free-flow of information if they are to comport with 
democratic norms.51  
Of course, bottom-up lawmaking, particularly the type of regulatory bottom-
up lawmaking that this article contemplates, falls short in terms of transparency. 
Instead, opaque practices infuse bottom-up lawmaking and belie notions of trans-
parent governance. As scholars and advocates, once we identify the sources of 
procedural woes, we tend to reach into our well-worn remedial toolbox in an at-
tempt to patch such deficiencies. Thus, our unflinching response at this juncture 
would normally be to prescribe “transparency,” to carve pre-fabricated “transpar-
ency” windows into bottom-up lawmaking processes. Yet, is this desirable? Or is 
this even possible? As for the first question, it is at least conceivable that transpar-
ency will open the “floodgates” too wide, permitting a surge of participation, in 
particular interest-group, rent-seeking demands that will unmoor bottom-up 
lawmaking from its practice-based roots, essentially transforming it into a process 
more akin to its top-down counterpart. As for the second question, we must at 
least contemplate whether our standard approach to transparency synchronizes 
with a bottom-up form of lawmaking.
 51. While we are talking here more of “participatory” forms of democracy than “republican” 
forms of democracy, which, as discussed above, are not particularly relevant when the “governors” 
are non-elected, free-flow of information seems to be the linchpin to all forms of democracy.
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While transparency is quite a “buzz word” in international governance 
today,52 it will serve as a “legitimating” force only if it opens a meaningful win-
dow for stakeholders; otherwise, it is mere window-dressing. If the Berne Union 
were to publish the General Understanding on its website, but publish it after the 
members have concluded its terms, this type of transparency would not permit 
meaningful participation in the shaping of law. While subsequent input could 
presumably shape the future course of such law (i.e., lobbying for repeal or amend-
ment), rules quickly become institutionalized and thereby “sticky,” limiting the 
practical impact of post-hoc, as opposed to prior participation in the lawmaking 
process. Alternatively, if the Berne Union were to invite “stakeholders” or “civil 
society” to semi-annual meetings, but hold them in the world’s most exclusive re-
sorts (thereby making travel relatively expensive and inaccessible),53 or give only 
nominal notice of the meetings (again, when combined with the location this may 
make travel prohibitively expensive),54 or only have a few “slots” or “seats” allo-
cated for outside participants,55 this type of “openness” would not foster robust 
participation. In the end, transparency is not an end in and of itself but must be a 
means to an end—that end being an inclusive, participatory process that supports 
accountability as the critical bridge between the “governed” and the “governors.” 
Furthermore, the very notion of transparency as a vehicle to meaningful par-
ticipation presupposes a more classic lawmaking model where lawmaking is cho-
reographed and linear, providing identifiable and productive moments when 
outsiders may assert pressure and influence over the course of law. In contrast, 
bottom-up lawmaking is an inherently organic process—messy and unpredict-
able in its spontaneity. All the transparency in the world may not actually engen-
der meaningful participation because it simply may not be clear to stakeholders 
 52. Transparency has been of particular concern vis-à-vis the International Monetary Fund, the 
World Bank, and the World Trade Organization. See, e.g., Miles Kahler, Defining Accountability 
Up: the Global Economic Multilaterals, 39 Gov’t & Opposit’n 132, 143–48 (2004); Joseph J. Norton, 
International Financial Institutions and the Movement Toward Greater Accountability and Transpar-
ency: The Case of Legal Reform Programmes and the Problem of Evaluation, 35 Int’l L. 1443 (2001); 
Stephan,  supra note 16, at 726–29. See Dickinson, supra note 44, at 168–79 (discussing transparency 
and transparency-enhancing mechanisms). 
 53. The Berne Union meetings are often held at exclusive, or relatively remote, destinations. See 
2006 Berne Union Y.B. 121, at 170, for a list of the locations of semi-annual meetings since 1995.
 54. See generally Levit, supra note 2, at 199 n.304.
 55. Id. (with regard to OECD efforts to promote transparency and participation, noting that 
consultative sessions were short, offering only a few “seats” for members of civil society interested 
in participating, and that the notices of the sessions were short, offering limited opportunities for 
real, effective participation).  
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when, where, or how to participate. Do we condemn the Berne Union members 
for not inviting NGOs and representatives from developing countries to also have 
drinks in the bar when they discussed the ideas that led to the Berne Union’s cre-
ation? Obviously not. But when do these informal activities cross the line? When 
do they assume a conscious lawmaking posture? It is possible that only hindsight 
will tell. The challenge, of course, is how to add transparency to processes of an 
improvisational and unplanned character. And, depending on the particular con-
text, it may be impossible to deploy our remedial arsenal, our standard answers to 
democratic deficits, within a bottom-up form of lawmaking. 
Yet, if we surmount these very real challenges and imagine a bottom-up law-
making community that practices meaningful openness,56 then bottom-up law-
making actually emerges as profoundly democratic, at least when juxtaposed with 
the classic top-down account of international lawmaking.57 From Seattle to Doha, 
one of the recurring critiques of globalization (and concomitantly intergovernmen-
tal institutions) is that it exports decision making and lawmaking to a suprana-
tional sphere, creating intolerably wide physical and metaphysical space between 
the “governed” and the “governors.” In this version, accountability is so attenuated 
as to be non-existent. Bottom-up lawmaking is quite the opposite; it is an inher-
ently grounded process where international lawmaking ensues in the trenches, 
driven by those who have a stake in the regulatory outcome, and it simultaneously 
contemplates a type of horizontal, transnational web of those similarly situated 
around the globe. Certainly, if we understand democracy in the participatory sense, 
of direct “participation” of those governed in the governing process, or even in the 
deliberative sense,58 then bottom-up lawmaking feels organically democratic.
 56. I recognize that participation in these lawmaking processes will not be truly inclusive and 
honestly representative of a plurality of ideas unless we account for asymmetries of power, imper-
fect information flows, unequal distribution of resources, or simply the chaos of lawmaking in 
such a decentralized, improvisational, and unpredictable way.  But is this not also true of any law-
making process, particularly those that occur on a transnational plane? Any time we journey from 
a hypothetical world, the friction of real-life intercourse creates an inevitable gap between imag-
ined and hard reality. Why should we hold these bottom-up processes to a higher standard than 
state-driven lawmaking? See generally Moravcsik, supra note 39 at 338–43. 
 57. See W. Michael Reisman, The Democratization of Contemporary International Law-Making 
Processes and the Differentiation of Their Application, in Developments of International Law in 
Treaty Making 15 (Rüdiger Wolfram & Volker Röben eds., 2005); Judith Resnik, Law’s Migra-
tion: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism’s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 Yale 
L. J. 1564, 1666 (2006).
 58. For an account of deliberative democracy, see Nino, supra note 39.
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C. Output Legitimacy
Thus far, the search for legitimacy—particularly accountability-anchored 
“input” legitimacy—holds limited promise. As private actors and non-elected offi-
cials drive the bottom-up lawmaking process, elections—delegating lawmaking 
responsibility to elected representatives—are not the route to accountability. And, it 
is difficult to inject transparency, the linchpin to participatory forms of accountabil-
ity, into non-choreographed lawmaking processes. While distasteful to some 
scholars,59 there are some who answer the legitimacy critique by eschewing “in-
puts” or “democratic processes” as the sole determinant of law’s legitimacy. Rather, 
performance, or effective outputs—norms, rules, or law—may lend legitimacy to 
law.60 While “input” legitimacy focuses on tightening the connection and the con-
gruence between the “governed” and the “governors,” “output” legitimacy hinges 
on governors’ expertise and alacrity as a means to strengthen trust in the governors. 
From my experience in practice, I have watched bottom-up lawmaking in 
action, and I have even been a bottom-up lawmaker.61 In reality, bottom-up law-
making communities demonstrate much ingenuity in the face of complex, techni-
cal issues. For instance, the General Understanding rules manage over a 
half-trillion dollars in trade per year,62 and these rules inure not only to the benefit 
of large multinational corporations but also help small exporters gain relatively 
inexpensive credit and participate on a “level playing field.” As bottom-up rules 
 59. See generally Fiss, supra note 26 (arguing that the use of “substantive outcomes” to legitimate law 
is “unexceptional,” and further noting that “substantive outcomes may lead people to approve of the 
results,” which is quite different from legitimacy, which requires “an independent set of criteria.”). 
 60. See Bodansky, supra note 31, at 619–20 (noting that “expertise” is a source of legitimacy be-
cause “we judge an institution by its fruits”); Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, The Club Model 
of Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy, in Efficiency, Equity, and 
Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium 264, 285–87 (Roger B. 
Porter et al. eds., 2001) (“[T]he legitimacy of governments is not determined solely by the proce-
dures on the input side. Substantive outputs also matter.”); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Government 
Networks: The Heart of Liberal Democratic Order, in Democratic Governance & International 
Law 199, 254 (Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Reth eds., 2000) ( “[O]n the other hand, legitimacy may 
be conferred or attained independent of mechanisms of direct accountability—performance may 
be measured by outcomes as much as process. Courts, and even central banks, can earn the trust 
and respect of voters without being ‘accountable’ in any direct sense.”); Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
Governing the Global Economy through Government Networks, in The Role of Law in Interna-
tional Politics 177, 195 (Michael Byers ed., 2000).
 61. See Levit, supra note 12, at n. 32.
 62. See Chino, supra, note 10.
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are “indigenous,”63 the fruits of those who day-in and day-out grapple with nitty 
gritty technicalities, it should come as no surprise that the solutions embodied 
therein often work quite well, especially from the vantage point of the crafters.  
Yet, this “ends justify the means” approach is unsatisfactory, perhaps unset-
tling, on numerous levels. “Effectiveness”—the meeting of regulatory goals—is 
an inherently subjective inquiry, turning on perspective and vantage point. If 
Berne Union rules limit export subsidies and, thereby, maintain prices at a rela-
tively high level, are the rules “effective” from the perspective of an importer or 
consumer in a developing country who cannot benefit from an ECA willing and 
able to subsidize the cost of imported goods? Likewise, from the perspective of 
Canada (Canadair), Berne Union-like limitations on export credit subsidies ef-
fectively “level” the playing field and protect government coffers. Nevertheless, I 
imagine that Brazil’s (Embraer’s) perspective is radically different. As a relatively 
late entrant into the aerospace market, Embraer likely views disproportionate 
government subsidies as the means to “level the playing field,” as the only chance 
it has to compete with the established giants from the industrialized “north.” 
Thus, when Brazil laments that industrialized (OECD) countries have “taken 
care of themselves”64 through Berne Union-like rules, Brazil essentially questions 
the substantive efficacy of such rules. “Effectiveness” thereby emerges as an elu-
sively subjective standard, unsatisfactory in its post hoc relativity. 
Even if it were possible to calibrate “effectiveness” using objective parameters, 
the “governed” must be able to measure outcomes against such objective standards. 
But how can institutions like the Berne Union open themselves to evaluation, show-
casing their skill and experience, behind currently high and nearly impenetrable 
walls? How can the “governed” make such assessments if the rules themselves—in 
this case the General Understanding—are guarded as the most precious of state 
secrets? At a minimum, institutions like the Berne Union must become incremen-
tally transparent, at least revealing substantive outcomes if not the deliberations 
leading to such outcomes, if they are to rely on “efficacy of outputs” as the arbiter of 
legitimacy. Yet, as discussed in the previous section, groups like the Berne Union are 
particularly resistant to even such limited, post-hoc transparency. 
 63. I borrow the term “indigenous law” from Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, 
Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law, 19 J. Leg. Pluralism 1, 17 (1981).
 64. See supra notes 29 & 30 and accompanying text.
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D. Self-Executing Legitimacy: Bottom-Up Lawmaking as a Route to Legitimacy
After contemplating various sources of legitimacy—both on the “input” or 
“process” side and the “output” or “substantive outcome” side—are we left with 
the unsettling conclusion that bottom-up lawmaking is an illegitimate, albeit in-
evitable, route to law? If efficacy of regulatory outputs is a less-than-satisfactory 
route to legitimacy, and if it is impractical to expect bottom-up lawmaking to be 
an open, participatory process at all junctures, is bottom-up lawmaking a rogue, 
yet untamable, form of lawmaking? Perhaps not. 
My current research—research on the transnational regulation of letters of 
credit via the International Chamber of Commerce Banking Commission65—is 
yielding data to suggest that an answer to the legitimacy critique may, in part, lie 
in the bottom-up lawmaking process itself; that perhaps “legitimacy” is a “self-
executing” feature of bottom-up lawmaking. When informal lawmaking com-
munities—like the Berne Union—step out and interact with officialdom (i.e., the 
WTO), which is an endemic part of the bottom-up lawmaking process, the mod-
icum of transparency and accountability that these institutions have themselves 
adopted (largely at the prompting of the broader international community) tends 
to “rub off.” In other words, the interinstitutional interplay inherent to bottom-up 
lawmaking may actually correct some of the legitimacy deficits in concrete ways 
(by creating “transparency windows” and enhancing “accountability capacity”) 
and in less concrete ways (by shifting institutional consciousness). 
As Berne Union rules develop behind opaque, fortress-like walls and seep 
beyond the insular lawmaking group, as they do via incorporation into the WTO 
Agreement on Subsidies, the WTO carves “transparency windows” for the Berne 
Union, and the Berne Union responds to global exposure and concomitant de-
mands by enhancing its “accountability capacity.” For instance, while the Berne 
Union’s General Understanding is “secret,” WTO documents are publicly avail-
able, in large part because the international community has demanded that the 
WTO inculcate “transparency” as an institutional norm.66 Although no longer 
parading as Berne Union rules, the WTO functionally “publicizes” such rules 
and carves “transparency windows” when it incorporates them into the Agree-
 65. See Levit,  supra note 14.
 66. The WTO, largely in response to a vociferous critique of its opaque processes, now identifies 
“transparency,” as one of the core principles of the international trading system and also has devel-
oped a comprehensive website which posts documents, interpretive material, and dispute settle-
ment decisions. See, e.g., WTO, Understanding the WTO: Principles of the Trading System, http://
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2007).
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ment on Subsidies. Likewise, as the WTO appropriates Berne Union rules within 
the Agreement on Subsidies, the congruence between the “governed” and the 
“governors” disintegrates, and the “governed” (yet disenfranchised) begin to de-
mand access to the Berne Union as a means to participate in lawmaking processes 
and thereby hold the “governors” accountable. In response to similar criticism 
from disenfranchised constituents, formal lawmaking institutions, like the WTO 
and OECD, have institutionalized outreach to non-members as a means of en-
hancing accountability.67 Likewise, the Berne Union established the “Prague 
Club,” a sister group of export credit insurers from the developing world, who do 
not meet the business-volume-driven membership requirements, but who none-
theless may observe and even participate in Berne Union deliberations.68
The Berne Union, through interface with formal lawmaking communities 
like the WTO, mimics approaches to transparency and accountability, importing 
legitimacy-enhancing practices and processes. Yet these innovations are not her-
metically sealed within the institution; instead, they gradually infuse the Berne 
Union at the level of institutional consciousness, and it appears as if the Berne 
Union has at least started to internalize transparency and accountability as desir-
able institutional norms. For instance, for the first time, in late 2004, the Berne 
Union published a “Value Statement,” in which it nods to the importance of trans-
parency.69 And the Berne Union has recently revamped its website a bit, posting 
additional information and periodic press releases.70 The Berne Union admittedly 
falls short of the type of open, transparent governance that we have come to ex-
pect from democratically responsive institutions. Yet, shifts in institutional con-
sciousness will undoubtedly propel the Berne Union to embrace transparency and 
accountability in diverse endeavors and, ultimately, to repair many, if not most, of 
the democratic deficits. 
In interacting with official lawmaking institutions—an inherent part of the 
bottom-up lawmaking process—the Berne Union expanded its capacity to reach 
out to otherwise underrepresented constituencies and opened a more transparent 
 67. See OECD, Public Affairs Division, Public Affairs and Communications Directorate, 
Annual Report 2006 at 7, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/37/61/36511265.pdf.
 68. See International Union of Credit and Investment Insurers, Berne Union, Prague Club, 
http://www.berneunion.org.uk/prague_club.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2008). 
 69. See, e.g., Press Release, Berne Union, Three New Members Join the Berne Union (Oct. 
2004), available at http://www.berneunion.org.uk/pdf/Press%20Release%20October%202004.pdf 
(discussing a “Value Statement” which acknowledges the importance of “transparency”).
 70. See Berne Union, Press Releases, http://www.berneunion.org.uk/press-releases.html (last vis-
ited June 12, 2008). 
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window into its processes. These concrete, institutional adjustments, in turn, 
gradually shifted the Berne Union’s institutional consciousness in favor of such 
legitimacy-enhancing measures. Thus, “legitimacy” emerges as a self-executing 
feature of bottom-up lawmaking processes. What are the lessons or “take aways” 
from this conclusion? 
The first is prescriptive. As lawyers, our inclination is to offer immediate pro-
grammatic fixes in the face of structural deficits in lawmaking processes. However, 
in the context of bottom-up lawmaking, “legitimacy” may be an evolutionary phe-
nomenon, growing naturally and endogenously as the lawmaking process unfolds. 
We may not be able to breed “legitimacy” by simply superimposing cookie-cutter 
processes from classically democratic institutions. Yet, while informal lawmaking 
communities like the Berne Union may be relatively impervious to artificial at-
tempts to inject transparency or enhance accountability, moments of interface with 
formal lawmaking communities nonetheless present fruitful “legitimating” oppor-
tunities. Thus, as the WTO imports Berne Union norms, it simultaneously exports 
transparency; as the WTO conveys Berne Union rules to a broader community, it, 
in turn, relays demands for input and participation. To the extent that we, as law-
yers, have irrepressible “fix-it” instincts, we should focus on the “joints”71—the inter-
action between informal and formal lawmakers. Moreover, we should recognize 
such moments of interface as ultimately conveying our efforts to introduce demo-
cratic practices within formal lawmaking institutions to the very informal commu-
nities that have been elusively impervious to our direct attempts.
The second lesson is normative. Legitimacy may be a red herring; as scholars, 
we need not excessively fixate on “legitimacy” because “legitimacy” may correct 
itself. As already discussed at length, “legitimacy” is self-executing—the inter-
institutional interplay inherent to bottom-up lawmaking may actually correct, or 
ameliorate, some of the legitimacy deficits. Additionally, bottom-up lawmaking, 
the very process that presents legitimacy concerns in a particularly sharp and con-
ceptually difficult way, may itself be self-limiting. 
If the bottom-up lawmaking process naturally breeds transparency and ac-
countability, then groups like the Berne Union will face (and indeed have faced) 
mounting demands for participation in the lawmaking process. Yet, in opening 
itself to “outsiders” and increasingly diversifying its previously homogeneous face, 
it becomes very difficult for groups like the Berne Union to continue the loop of 
practice-based, bottom-up lawmaking. To the extent that these lawmaking pro-
 71. I borrow this appropriately descriptive term from Kal Raustiala & David G. Victor, The 
Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources, 58 Int’l Org. 277, 280 (2004).
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cesses are rooted in the technical experiences of niche communities, broad-based 
participation may be counterproductive by opening the floodgates to outside pres-
sure, scrutiny, and demands, conceivably spelling the disintegration of the very 
practice-based, bottom-up lawmaking community that delivers relatively effec-
tive regulatory solutions. Indeed, there are signs that the Berne Union is shifting 
from a rulemaking, regulatory forum to a type of back-room, think tank-like ap-
pendage to the WTO, OECD, and World Bank, morphing into a laboratory for 
using private export credit transactions as a vehicle to balance the sometimes com-
peting pulls of “free” or liberalized trade, on the one hand, and environmental 
and human rights norms, on the other hand.72 In other words, over time, groups 
like the Berne Union may become dislodged from their practice-based roots and 
cede their lawmaking role to more formal, top-down lawmaking institutions. 
Alternatively, if a group like the Berne Union rejected demands for participa-
tion, and thus tried to preserve the insular integrity of its homogeneous group, 
disaffected constituents could congeal in alternate, competing lawmaking com-
munities. Of course, disparities in power, influence, and resources, particularly of 
the type that separate the developing from the industrialized world, may limit the 
ability of Brazil, for instance, to create an institution that meaningfully competes 
with the Berne Union. However, developing countries are not the only group that 
could challenge the Berne Union’s niche hegemony. The private sector is aggres-
sively deploying the Internet to create innovative alternatives to traditional export 
credit insurance products.73 And this type of competitive “molecularization” 
could, conceivably, challenge the Berne Union’s normative relevance and relegate 
its bottom-up lawmaking role, and the attendant “legitimacy” grievances, to that 
of an outlier. 
Thus, as my bottom-up lawmaking project matures, and as I start to look at 
groups like the Berne Union from a longitudinal perspective, I have come to un-
derstand that these groups often bear the seeds of their own limits, and possibly 
 72. See generally 2005 Berne Union Y.B. 
 73. See Richard Barovick, The Changing World of Trade Finance, World Trade, April 2004, at 
18. Additionally, the Internet revolution has spawned several companies who strive to harness 
electronic media to discover more efficient and less labor intensive alternatives to the letter of 
credit. TradeCard, Inc. is an online provider of financial settlement products (including products 
that function much like letters of credit) for international trade transactions. However, TradeCard 
does not run its transactions through a bank; instead a patented software program checks the 
documents and an export credit insurer essentially provides a “guarantee” in the face of buyer de-
fault. For more information, see www.tradecard.com. TradeCard has a few competitors, including 
Bolero, an AIG product, and a new product introduced by CIT. Gabriel Kahn, Financing Goes 
Just-in-Time, Wall St. J., June 4, 2004, at A10.
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devolution. Therefore, questions of legitimacy need not unduly preoccupy us. 
Perhaps, bottom-up lawmaking, and the inter-institutional dynamics that it un-
leashes, is at once self-correcting and self-limiting. 
Conclusion
So in returning to the grand questions posed at the symposium—Democracy 
and the Transnational Private Sector—is the transnational private sector indeed 
an ascendant feature of international lawmaking? And, if so, does this create a 
threat to democracy? This article introduces one, but certainly not the only, way 
in which the private sector makes law—bottom-up transnational lawmaking. 
While this article explores one example in depth—the Berne Union’s regulation 
of export credit insurance—I nonetheless argue that bottom-up lawmaking pep-
pers our legal landscape in a profound and largely unacknowledged way. Thus, 
the private sector is a constitutive feature of much that we consider to be “law”—
both domestic and international. Therefore, if we, as scholars and advocates, hope 
to affect the course of law, we must be attentive to its roots and not deceptively 
complacent with what we see on the surface. 
I am less concerned than others at this conference about the normative rami-
fications; perhaps, in the context of private transnational lawmaking, we unduly 
fixate on questions of legitimacy and democracy. Indeed, bottom-up lawmaking 
often is closed, exclusive, and club-like. Yet, democratic processes are not the sole 
source of legitimacy. And, even if they were, bottom-up lawmaking ostensibly 
bears self-correcting seeds. So, while some of the less-than-democratic practices 
embedded in bottom-up lawmaking uncomfortably tug at my notion of what law 
should be, what I am beginning to understand, and perhaps, from a democratic 
legitimacy vantage point appreciate, is that there appears to be a top to the bot-
tom-up.
